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Abstract
This paper investigates the syntactic and semantic properties of counterfactual
attitude verbs in Taiwanese Southern Min, showing the differences between this
type of attitude verbs and those discussed by Anand and Hacquard (2013). I
propose that the semantics of counterfactual attitude verbs is composed of two
components, a doxastic assertion and a counterfactual felicity condition, the former
of which makes them pattern with representational attitude verbs (Bolinger 1968)
whereas the latter differentiates them. This latter component is also responsible for
the epistemic licensing behavior of counterfactual attitude verbs, that is, such
attitude verbs allowing epistemic necessity but not possibility modals in their
complement clauses. This paper contributes to the study of attitude verbs by
singling out counterfactual attitudes from the representational category and
motivating a finer-grained typology of attitudes based on the distributional facts
concerning epistemic licensing.
1 Background
This work contributes to the study of attitude predicates by singling out counterfactual
attitudes from the so-called “representational attitudes” (Bolinger 1968) and motivating
a finer-grained typology of attitudes based on the distributional differences of epistemic
modals. This type of attitude expresses the meaning that the attitude holder believes
the embedded proposition to be true in the attitude world, but the proposition turns
out to be false in the actual world. I call this type of attitude “counterfactual attitudes”.
In this paper, I investigate the syntactic and semantic properties of counterfactual
attitudes, focusing on 掠準 liah8-tsun2 ‘to think (counterfactually)’ in Taiwanese
Southern Min (hereafter, TSM) as a case study. TSM has several counterfactual
attitude verbs, such as 掠準 liah8-tsun2, 掠做 liah8-tso3, and 叫是 kio3-si7, and
speakers of different varieties of TSM may have different choices of verbs as their
vocabulary for counterfactual attitude. These three verbs all have similar behavior, as
exemplified by 1–3 below. Most of the TSM data used for illustration are extracted
from Taiwanese television dramas and folk storiesa and Taiwanese Concordancer
(Iunn5, Un2-gian5 楊允言 2003). This latter corpus includes more than 3,000,000
words, collected from vernacular texts composed by various authors. In addition to
these corpora, some of the examples are produced in an introspective way based on
grammaticality judgments of native speakers.
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(1)我掠準你咧睏。(Iunn5, Un2-gian5 楊允言 2003: 37)
gua2__liah8-tsun2__li2__teh4__khun3b.
I__think__you__PRG__sleep
I thought that you were sleeping.








I thought that this could make money.
The reason I choose liah8-tsun2 as the case study is that though it may not be
commonly used in some varieties of TSM, only liah8-tsun2 is used exclusively as a
counterfactual attitude verb, while the other two verbs can have other uses. For
example, liah8-tso3 can mean that A is considered or regarded as B, as shown in 4,
which is an Exceptional Case Marking (ECM) usage, having nothing to do with
counterfactuality.





Except for death, I consider nothing in the world interesting.
In the following discussion, I will take liah8-tsun2 as an example to demonstrate
the syntactic and semantic properties of counterfactual attitude verbs in TSM, and
to show the important differences of counterfactual attitudes from other types of
attitudes, with a special focus on a distributional puzzle—the licensing behavior of
epistemic modals. This distributional puzzle will be the main issue of this paper. I
will first demonstrate the empirical fact that counterfactual attitudes allow
epistemic necessity but not possibility modals in their complement clauses, and
then provide a semantic account for this fact.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I give a brief review of the literature
on attitudes and epistemics, with a special emphasis on Anand and Hacquard’s (2013)
study. Section 3 presents the syntactic and semantic properties of counterfactual
attitudes in TSM and the distribution of epistemic modals in this attitudinal context. In
Section 4, I present the semantics of counterfactual attitudes, based on which the distri-
butional fact is accounted for. In addition, I adopt the analysis advocated by Veltman
(1996), Hacquard (2006, 2010), and Yalcin (2007) that embedded epistemic modals
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obtain their modal bases via anaphoric reference. My analysis is sketched in the follow-
ing lines: counterfactual attitudes provide an information state that epistemic
modals can be anaphoric to, thereby licensing epistemic modals; however, the
counterfactual component in the semantics of such attitudes, as a felicity condition,
filters out epistemic possibility modals, since the resulting existential quantification
over the information state via semantic composition of the modals and the embed-
ding attitude implies that the domain of quantification is not totally excluded from
the set of “common ground” worlds that contain all background information estab-
lished in the actual world (see Stalnaker 1970, 2002 for the notion of common
ground). This leads to violation of the felicity condition. Therefore, epistemic possi-
bility modals cannot be licensed in this attitudinal context. I conclude this paper
in Section 5.
2 Review of the literature on attitudes and epistemics
2.1 Two types of attitudes
Standard Hintikkan semantics (Hintikka 1969) treats all attitude verbs as universal
quantifiers over possible worlds. However, this uniform treatment has been argued
in recent work on attitudes to fail to predict any major linguistic differences be-
tween classes of attitude verbs, say, attitudes of belief and attitudes of desire (e.g.,
Farkas 1992; Moltmann 2003; Laca 2013; Anand and Hacquard 2013). The two
classes of attitude verbs do show important differences with respect to their diverse
complementation behavior, for example, mood choice and temporal orientation of
their complement clauses.
Among others, Anand and Hacquard (2013) focus on a distributional difference
between attitudes of belief or “attitudes of acceptance” in Stalnaker’s (1984) term and
attitudes of desire or command. They distinguish the former class of attitude verbs
from the latter in terms of their licensing behavior of epistemic modals. As the exam-
ples 5 and 6 illustrate, attitudes of acceptance including doxastics, semifactives, and
verbs of argumentation allow for epistemic interpretations of modals in their comple-
ment clauses while attitudes of desire or command do not.
(5)a. John thinks that Mary has to be innocent.
b. Mary believes that John might be running late.
c. John discovered that Mary had to be the murderer.
d. Mary claims that John might come to the party.
(6)a. #John wants Mary to have to be the murderer.
b. #Mary demanded that John might be running late.
c. #Mary requests that John might come to the party.
Anand and Hacquard (2013) argue that this distributional puzzle is due to a substan-
tive difference between the two types of attitude verbs—representationality. According
to them, attitudes of acceptance are “representational” (Bolinger 1968) in that this type
of attitude verb describes the content of a propositionally consistent attitudinal state.
The semantics of representational attitude verbs they propose is given in 7, and I take
the verb believe for illustration here.
Hsiao Lingua Sinica  (2017) 3:4 Page 3 of 27
(7)For any attitude att,
[[att φ]]c,w,S,g = λx. ∀w’∈S’: [[[φ]]c,w’,S’,g = 1], where S’ is the quantificational domain
provided by att.
➔ [[believe φ]]c,w,S,g = λx. ∀w’∈S’: [[[φ]]c,w’,S’,g = 1], where S’ = DOXx,w
(In all worlds w’ compatible with the attitude holder x’s beliefs in w, φ is true in w’.)
(Anand and Hacquard 2013: 8-16 and 8-21)
On the other hand, attitudes of desire or command are non-representational.
They do not provide an information state, but have a comparative semantics, com-
bining with their complement proposition by comparing it to contextual alterna-
tives. Thus, they invoke ordering between alternatives (Bolinger 1968; Stalnaker
1984; Heim 1992; Farkas 2003; Villalta 2000, 2008). Anand and Hacquard (2013)
call this type of attitude verbs “preference-oriented attitudes.” The semantics of
non-representational attitudes is presented in 8, in which the volitional bouletic
verb want is taken as the example. To capture the inability of non-representational
attitudes to provide an information state, the relevant parameter is set to the
empty set ∅, as shown in 8.
(8)[[want φ]]c,w,S,g = λx. λw’. [[φ]]c,w’,∅,g > DESx,w λw’. ¬[[φ]]
c,w’,∅,g
(φ is more desirable to the attitude holder x in w than ¬φ.)
(Anand and Hacquard 2013: 8–21)
Based on this fundamental split in the semantics of attitude verbs, Anand and Hacquard
(2013) derive the generalization in 9 to capture the pattern exemplified in 5 and 6.
(9)Epistemic Licensing Generalization (Anand and Hacquard 2013: 8–3)
Epistemic modals are licensed only in representational attitudes.
To account for this empirical fact, Anand and Hacquard (2013) also adopt the
proposal from the literature on epistemic modality (Veltman 1996; Hacquard 2006,
2010; Yalcin 2007) that the embedded epistemic modals need to be evaluated relative
to an appropriate information state, which is accessible when they are embedded under
representational attitude verbs. Since embedded epistemic modals retrieve a quantifica-
tional domain from the embedding attitude, they are licensed only in the attitudes that
can provide an information state, namely the representational ones. Non-representational
attitudes do not provide an information state; therefore, they do not allow for epistemic
interpretations of embedded modals.
2.2 The third type of attitude
In view of this sensitivity of epistemic modals to the attitude type, Anand and
Hacquard (2013) argue that in addition to representational and non-representational
attitudes, there is a third type of attitude, which has a hybrid semantics, containing
both a doxastic component and an ordering component. Such attitudes include emotive
doxastics (hope, fear) and dubitatives (doubt). They share properties with both repre-
sentational and preference-oriented attitudes.
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This type of attitude patterns with representational attitudes in many aspects (see
Scheffler 2008, Anand and Hacquard 2013 for more details); it asserts that the preja-
cent proposition is a doxastic possibility and meanwhile requires the other alterna-
tives to be also possible. The following examples show the contrast between emotive
doxastics (e.g. hope) and desideratives (e.g. want), in which hope p is infelicitous with an
assertion of the certainty of p (or not p) since it requires relevant alternative propositions
to be doxastic possibilities and thus conveys uncertainty about p’s truth, while want im-
poses no such constraint but merely conveys the preferences of the attitude holder.
(10)It is raining. (Scheffler 2008)
a. # I hope it is raining.
b. √ I want it to be raining.
(11)It isn’t raining. (Scheffler 2008)
a. # I hope it is raining.
b. √ I want it to be raining.
The fact that this third type of attitude conveys a doxastic assertion suggests that it
describes an information state which supplies a modal base to embedded epistemic
modals. Therefore, epistemic modals are expected to be licensed by this type of atti-
tude. As the examples 12–16 show, however, only epistemic possibility modals are good
in this attitudinal context. The first three of these examples illustrate the case of emo-
tive doxastics, and the last two the case of dubitatives, all of which are taken from
Anand and Hacquard’s (2013: 8–10 and 8–34) study.
(12)John hopes that it might be raining.
(13)Jean__craint__que__Marie__puisse__avoir__connu__son__tueur.
Jean__fears__that__Marie__can-SUBJ__have__known__her__killer
John fears that Mary may have known her killer.
(14)#Jean__craint__que__Marie__doive__avoir__connu__son__tueur.
Jean__fears__that__Marie__must-SUBJ__have__known__her__killer
#John fears that Mary must have known her killer.
(15)Jean__doute__que__Marie__puisse__avoir__connu__son__tueur.
Jean__doubts__that__Marie__can-SUBJ__have__known__her__killer
John doubts that Mary may have known her killer.
(16)#Jean__doute__que__Marie__doive__avoir__connu__son__tueur.
Jean__doubts__that__Marie__must-SUBJ__have__known__her__killer
#John doubts that Mary must have known her killer.
What rules out epistemic necessity modals, as Anand and Hacquard (2013) point
out, will be an incompatibility between the certainty of such modals and the uncer-
tainty about the truth of the prejacent proposition, which is brought forth due to the
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inference that all relevant alternatives are doxastic possibilities. Anand and Hacquard
argue that the semantics of this type of attitude also contains a preference component,
in addition to the representational component. What the preference component is
taken to do here is “express the attitude holder’s preference for how this uncertainty
gets resolved” (2013: 8–28). This meaning component serves to indicate a preference
between various subsets of the attitude holder’s doxastic state. For example, if John
hopes that it is raining, he is uncertain about whether it is raining or not, but his
preference is shown to be in favor of rain. That is, John prefers the subset of his
doxastic state in which it is raining over that in which it is not.
The following examples, from Anand and Hacquard (2013: 8–34 and 8–36),
concretely illustrate the hybrid semantics of emotive doxastics (e.g. hope) and
dubitatives (e.g. doubt) with epistemic might, which is composed of three compo-
nents—an uncertainty felicity condition, an existential doxastic assertion, and a
preference assertion.
(17)John hopes that it might be raining.
Uncertainty: There is a non-trivial subset of John’s belief worlds where it is raining
and a non-trivial subset where it is not raining.
Doxastic: There is a world compatible with John’s beliefs where it is raining.
Preference: Rain is more desirable to John than no rain.
(18)John doubts that it might be raining.
Uncertainty: There is a non-trivial subset of John’s belief worlds where it is raining
and a non-trivial subset where it is not raining.
Doxastic: There is a world compatible with John’s beliefs where it is raining.
Preference: No rain is more likely to John than rain.
2.3 The fourth typological possibility
Anand and Hacquard’s (2013) typology of attitudes is based on the semantics of the
verbs determined by two meaning components—a representational component and a
preference component. Those with a representational component are representational
attitudes, those with a preference component are non-representational attitudes, and
emotive doxastics and dubitatives have a hybrid semantics, constituting the third type.
However, if we consider these three types of attitudes from another angle, viz. the inter-
action between the embedding attitude verbs and the embedded epistemic modals, we
may ask whether a fourth typological possibility exists, as Table 1 shows: could there be
a fourth class of attitude verbs, which allows epistemic necessity but not possibility
modals in their complement clauses?
Table 1 A typology of epistemic licensing in attitudes
Epistemic licensing Attitude type
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In what follows, I will show that the fourth typological possibility does exist. This is
the case for counterfactual attitudes, which are not taken into account by Anand and
Hacquard (2013), and will be discussed in the remainder of the paper.
3 Counterfactual attitudes in TSM
In this section, I introduce the syntactic and semantic properties of counterfactual
attitudes in TSM and the distribution of epistemic modals in this attitudinal context.
Based on these facts, I argue that counterfactual attitude verbs should be singled out
from the representational category as the fourth type of attitude verb.
3.1 Representationality
I take liah8-tsun2 as an example to show the syntactic and semantic properties of
counterfactual attitude verbs in TSM. This type of attitude expresses the meaning that
the attitude holder believes the embedded proposition to be true in the attitude world,
but the proposition turns out to be false in the actual world. This is illustrated by 19–
22. Note that the continuations in 20–22 make it clear that the propositions embedded
under liah8-tsun2 are judged false in the actual world.




At first sight, you would definitely think that he was an aborigine.
(20)大部份的人攏掠準英語是美國的官方語言。其實, 美國並無… (Iunn5, Un2-





Most people thought that English was the official language of America. Actually,
America does not …
(21)你掠準我會流目屎是無? 袂!我袂! (Iunn5, Un2-gian5 楊允言 2003: 5)
li2__liah8-tsun2__gua2__e7__lau5__bak8-sai2__si7__bo5?__bue7!__gua2__bue7.
You__think__I__will__shed__tear__COP__NEG__won’t__I__won’t
You thought that I would shed tears, didn’t you? No, I won’t.




They thought that I feared a hoe; actually, what I feared is a sword.
Since counterfactual attitude verbs quantify over a set of doxastic worlds, they denote
representational attitudes. Scheffler (2008) points out that an attitude verb which has a
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representational doxastic component can be used to felicitously respond to a question
while desideratives and directives, which have a preference component and are non-
representational, may not. The dialog below from Scheffler (2008) illustrates the con-
trast between hope and want, namely the contrast with and without a representational
component. In 23, B’s answer with hope is felicitous, unlike that with want. Scheffler
argues that B’s assertion of hope p entails that p is a possibility, hence providing a
partial answer to A’s question.
(23) A: Kommt Peter heute? (Scheffler 2008)
Is Peter coming today?
B: Ich hoffe/*will, dass er heute kommt.
I hope/*want that he is coming today.
This diagnostic test is applied to liah8-tsun2, as illustrated by 24, which shows that
liah8-tsun2 is an attitude verb with a representational component. In 24, B asserts with
liah8-tsun2 (p) that p holds in his belief world. This felicitously responds to A’s
question as a partial answer. On the contrary, C’s answer with want or command is not














C: #I want/command him to come.
Further evidence showing that liah8-tsun2 patterns with representational attitudes
comes from the fact that attitudes of desire can be modified by degree modifiers
while attitudes of acceptance cannot (cf. Villalta 2006). This is exemplified by 25
and 26.
(25) a. What I want the most is for Mary to leave.




I want him to come very much.




*I thought very much that he would come.
The empirical data given above attest that counterfactual attitudes like liah8-tsun2
are representational.
3.2 Indicative-selecting, yet having no parenthetical uses
Previous studies on mood and attitudes have arrived at a consensus that indicative-
selecting attitudes require commitment to truth of the embedded proposition by the
attitude holder while subjunctive-selecting attitudes lack a notion of commitment but
express preferences (Bolinger 1968; Farkas 1992, 2003; Portner 1997; Villalta 2000,
2008). In view of these semantic differences reflected via mood selection, liah8-tsun2
and the other counterfactual attitude verbs in TSM are obviously indicative-selecting
attitudes. They embed complement clauses with indicative mood, describing a mistaken
judgment of truth by the attitude holder.
In addition, as shown in the above examples, all the subjects of the sentences
containing liah8-tsun2 are animate. This is undoubtedly because the attitude holder of
this verb type can only be a human being. We can also see from examples 19–22 that
the attitude holder of liah8-tsun2 is not restricted to the speaker only. The fact that the
grammatical subjects of such sentences cannot be inanimate suggests that liah8-tsun2
is not dislocatable. Thus, it does not have a “slifting” (Ross 1973) or raising structure as
some other representational attitude verbs such as think in English and 拍算 phah4-
sng3 ‘to think’ in TSM (Hsiao 2013) do.
The example 27 shows that the attitude verb phah4-sng3 in TSM can have a slifting or
raising structure. In 27, the grammatical subject of the sentence is inanimate, which is ac-




It will rain tomorrow, I think.
Phah4-sng3 in this case functions as an evidential marker, expressing the speaker’s
attitude toward the proposition it modifies, that is, the modified proposition being
epistemically possible (see Hsiao 2013 for more discussion on phah4-sng3). Similarly,
think in English also shows positional mobility, which is characteristic of a slifting
phrase, as illustrated by 28. It has been argued in literature (e.g., Thompson and Mulac
1991) that (I) think has undergone grammaticalization and been reanalyzed as an
epistemic adverb or an evidential marker.
(28) a. I think John is home.
b. John is home, I think.
c. John, I think, is home.
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Such positional mobility, however, cannot be found in the case of counterfactual








*A-bing was sleeping at home, I thought.
Nor do the counterfactual attitude verbs have the so-called “parenthetical uses”
(Urmson 1952). Parenthetical uses refer to a discourse property of the embedding
verbs. That is, the verbs that exhibit parenthetical uses do not constitute the main point
of an utterance, but serve discourse functions like evidentiality, though syntactically
they remain in the same position as an ordinary embedding verb. Authors of many
studies have argued that representational attitude verbs can exhibit parenthetical uses
(e.g., Urmson 1952; Hooper 1975; Simons 2007). The following examples cited from
Simons (2007: 1036) illustrate that different utterances of the same sentence can have
different main points. In 30, the response a is the direct answer to A’s question, and the
responses b–j are different ways of delivering the same answer, that is, the content of
the embedded clause. In these cases, the embedded clause carries the main point of the
utterance, and the embedding attitude verb functions as an evidential marker, convey-
ing the information about the source of the claim, or the reliability or probability of the
claim. On the other hand, in other contexts like that shown in 31, the attitude verb
takes the main point status.
(30) A: Who was Louise with last night?
B: a. She was with Bill.
b. Henry thinks/I think that she was with Bill.
c. Henry believes/I believe that she was with Bill.
d. Henry said that she was with Bill.
e. Henry suggested that she was with Bill.
f. Henry hinted that she was with Bill.
g. Henry imagines/I imagine that she was with Bill.
h. Henry supposes/I suppose that she was with Bill.
i. Henry heard/I heard that she was with Bill.
j. Henry is convinced/I’m convinced that she was with Bill.
(31) A: What is bothering Henry?
B: He thinks that Louise was with Bill last night.
What 30 indicates is that representational attitudes have parenthetical uses.
However, the same situation cannot be found in cases involving a counterfactual
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attitude verb. That is, counterfactual attitudes do not have parenthetical uses
even though they are also representational attitudes; they always take the main
point status in utterances. Consider the following examples. It is evident that the
response 32b is not an appropriate answer to A’s question, unlike the correspond-
ing cases shown in 30. The inappropriateness of a sentence with an embedding
counterfactual attitude verb as the answer to such a question given in 32 suggests
that counterfactual attitudes do contribute to the at-issue content of the




















He thought that A-ing was with Mr. Wang yesterday.
3.3 Unnegatability
Another property that distinguishes counterfactual attitudes from other representa-
tional attitudes is their unnegatability. The following examples illustrate that counter-
factual attitude verbs such as liah8-tsun2 cannot be negated, as shown in 34, while
other representational attitude verbs can. Examples 35 and 36 are exemplification of
doxastic verbs, 37 of semi-factive verbs, and 38 of verbs of argumentation. I argue that
the contrast between 34 and 35–38 can be attributed to the semantics of counterfactual
attitudes, which involves a counterfactual component. In the next subsection, I will




He didn’t mistakenly think that A-ing was with Mr. Wang yesterday.
























I didn’t discover that he has a talent for writing.
b. 我發覺伊無寫作个才能。(Iunn5, Un2-gian5楊允言 2003: 14)
gua2__huat4-kak4__i1__bo5__sia2-tsok4__e5__tsai5-ling5.
I__discover__he__NEG.have__writing__MOD__talent








They said the old woman is not from Taipei.
3.4 Counterfactual presupposition
The counterfactual interpretation of liah8-tsun2 and its kin is derived as a presup-
position, rather than a conversational implicature, since it is indefeasible. The fol-
lowing examples illustrate this. In 39 and 40, the b sentence cannot be a felicitous
continuation of the a sentence with liah8-tsun2 in that the attitude holder, namely
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the speaker in these two cases, knows that her belief in p (the prejacent propos-
ition) is a mistaken thought, and that ¬p is the fact, and therefore, the assertion of
p in 39b and 40b contradicts her understanding. The counterfactual interpretation
of the a sentence in 39 and 40 cannot be canceled. Note that what is presupposed
in the cases under discussion is not p (the prejacent proposition) per se, but the
negation of p (the background proposition). Take 39 for example. Since ¬p is the
assumed background, namely that the individual in question is not an aborigine,
the following assertion of p that the individual is an aborigine in 39b would result
in a contradiction with the assumed background. On the contrary, the assertion of
¬p in 39c makes the background assumption articulated. The infelicity of 39b
























As a result, he didn’t come yesterday.





I thought that he was an aborigine; to my surprise, he really is.
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However, 41 is not a real counter-example to my claim. In 41, the phrase 想袂到
siong2-be7-kau3 ‘to one’s surprise’ is involved, which not only indicates that the
following assertion of p (i.e., the individual is an aborigine) is surprising to the
speaker, but also encodes a “downdate” (McCready 2005) of ¬p that is assumed in
the information state (i.e., the common ground), which p is subsequently used to
update. The downdate and update operations change the original context into a
new one. This kind of cancelation is different from the cancelability of conversa-
tional implicatures. It is not that the presupposition is waived or weakened, but
that the discourse context is changed. Cases such as 41 can be dealt with in a
dynamic semantic framework (see, for example, Heim 1992).
The counterfactual presuppositions in sentences with liah8-tsun2 can be further
detected by the wait-a-minute test developed and popularized by von (see also
Matthewson 2006; Singh 2007). This test is proposed to separate presuppositions
from assertions. It works for presuppositions but not for assertions, which are not
in the common ground at the time of utterance. If a presupposition P is not in
the common ground at the time of utterance, the hearer can legitimately challenge
the speaker by using “Hey, wait a minute! I didn’t know P.” In contrast, an asser-
tion cannot be challenged in this way. This is illustrated by the example in
42, which is taken from von. The presupposition involved in 42 is the existence
presupposition of the.
(42) A: The mathematician who proved Goldbach’s Conjecture is a woman.
B: Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that someone proved Goldbach’s Conjecture.
B’: #Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that that was a woman.
The application of the wait-a-minute test to the case of liah8-tsun2 is as follows.
Suppose a scenario like 43.
(43) Scenario:
The speaker is a sales representative of the company A, and he planned to visit
the company B for business purposes. Before he went to the company B, he
happened to learn the name of the company B’s representative. He thought that
the representative of the company B was a man by judging the name. However, he
realized that he had made a mistake when he met the representative of the










I’m telling you, I thought that the sales representative of the company was a
man.










#Hey, wait a minute! I didn’t know you went to their company a
while ago.
The felicity of the hearer’s response in 43a to the speaker’s utterance indicates that
the speaker presupposed ¬p (the representative is a woman) when he uttered the
sentence containing liah8-tsun2 and took it for granted that ¬p is already shared infor-
mation among the participants in the conversation, so the hearer made a complaint
about the presupposition when it was not in fact established in his own information
state prior to the speaker’s utterance. An asserted, non-presuppositional part of the
speaker’s utterance, on the other hand, cannot be challenged in the same way, as shown
in the hearer’s illegitimate response in 43b.
A potential challenge for the feasibility of the wait-a-minute test is the example 44d.
One might think that the wait-a-minute test does not work only for presuppositions,
since the clausal complement of a non-factive attitude verb like 相信 xiangxin ‘believe’









Hey, wait a minute! I didn’t know there was a person who solved that problem.
However, this example does not really post a problem, because the A sentence in
44 indeed involves presuppositions triggered by the proper name 張三 Zhangsan
and the definite description 那個很難的問題 na-ge hen nan de wenti ‘that difficult
problem’.
It has been argued in studies conducted within the framework of dynamic semantics
(e.g., Geurts 1997; Maier 2007) that definite descriptions and proper names are presup-
position inducers, which trigger the presupposition that the referent is existent and
unique. Moreover, Geurts (1998) also argues that the verb believe triggers a certain
presupposition. According to him, presuppositions that are triggered in the scope of be-
lieve may give rise to two-sided readings, which are internal and external respectively.
Consider 45, from Geurts (1998: 551).
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(45) Louise believes that her niece lives in Leeds.
In 45, the attitude verb believe embeds a clause where the presupposition is triggered
by the definite description her niece that Louise has a niece. This presupposition is
construed externally as not being part of the attitude report. Besides, the internal
construal of a presupposition associated with 45 is that Louise believes that she has a
niece (see also Karttunen 1974 and Heim 1992). Such two-sided readings can be traced
to the definite description her niece, and thus are presuppositional in nature, which
usually come along with attitude ascriptions like 45.
In view of the above discussion, it is clear that in 44, the complement of xiangxin
involves the presuppositions that there exists a unique person whose name is Zhangsan
and that there is a difficult problem, which are triggered by the proper name and the
definite description. The sentence as a whole also presupposes that the attitude holder,
the speaker in this case, believes that there is a unique person whose name is Zhangsan
and there is a difficult problem to be solved. The utterance of the speaker A in 44
yields two-sided presuppositional interpretations, and accordingly, the challenge of the
hearer B by “Hey, wait a minute!” is legitimate. The test is valid.
In addition to the wait-a-minute test, another test provided by can also be used to de-
tect presuppositions. Consider the following sentences, cited from Singh (2007: 1). The
sentence in 48 can be concluded from both 46 and 47, but from 46 by entailment and
from 47 via presupposition.
(46) John has a German shepherd.
(47) John’s dog likes to play.
(48) John has a dog.
According to, if a sentence is concluded as a presupposition, then it is odd to expli-
citly assert ignorance about it and go on to presuppose it. The contrast between 49 and
50 demonstrates this effect.
(49) I don’t know whether John has a dog or not, but if he has a German shepherd, I
will invite him to the party.
(50) #I don’t know whether John has a dog or not, but if his dog likes to play, I will
invite him to the party.
This test is also applicable to counterfactual attitudes in TSM. The test result
supports my claim that the counterfactual interpretation is a presupposition. See the





#I don’t know whether the guy is a man or a woman; I thought that the guy was a man.






I don’t know whether the guy is a man or a woman, but (based on some evidence
or observations,) I think that the guy is a man.
When the counterfactual attitude verb liah8-tsun2 in 51 is replaced by its non-
presuppositional counterpart, 認為 jin7-ui5 ‘think,’ the resulting sentence becomes fe-
licitous, as 52 illustrates. The second conjunct in 52 does not carry a presupposition
that the person is a female, but only indicates the speaker’s belief in the gender of the
person. This sentence is thus felicitous without any contradiction between the two
conjuncts. If a presupposition is involved, then contradiction arises, rendering 51
infelicitous.
3.5 Epistemic licensing
Counterfactual attitudes in TSM share some properties with attitudes containing a
representational component, but differ from them in other respects, as we have
mentioned in the foregoing subsections. In addition, one more significant distinction
separating counterfactual attitudes from the other attitude types is their licensing
behavior of epistemic modals.
Anand and Hacquard (2013) discuss the distribution of epistemic modals in three types
of attitudinal contexts. They show that epistemic modals are acceptable in complements of
representational attitudes, but they are degraded in complements of non-representational
attitudes. As for the attitudes, which have a hybrid semantics combining a representational
component and a preference component, they allow epistemic possibility modals but dis-
allow necessity modals; see 12–16 above. Counterfactual attitudes in TSM behave differ-
ently from these three types of attitudes. They permit epistemic necessity but not










I thought that he might come yesterday, but he didn’t come in the end.
3.6 Summary
Counterfactual attitudes in TSM are representational and indicative-selecting attitudes,
but unlike those typical representational attitudes, they do not have parenthetical uses.
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They cannot be negated, either, since they have a counterfactual component in their
semantics, which stands as a presupposition. This counterfactual component is also
responsible for their epistemic licensing behavior, which distinguishes them from the
other types of attitudes. Table 2 presents a comparison between counterfactual attitudes
and the other attitude types. Based on these differences, I argue that counterfactual
attitudes must be separated from the representational attitudes, and constitute a fourth
type of attitude verb.
In the next section, I will give a semantic account of the distinctive properties of
counterfactual attitudes in TSM, particularly their epistemic licensing property. The
analysis I propose here builds on the interaction of the semantics of the embedding
attitude verbs and the semantic requirements of the embedded epistemic modals à la
Anand and Hacquard (2013).
4 The semantics of counterfactual attitudes
In this section, I first propose the semantics of counterfactual attitudes in TSM. The central
goal of my proposal is to capture the distribution of epistemic modals in this attitudinal
context based on the lexical semantics of the attitudes under discussion. In Section 4.3, I
further raise a possible question about the observation concerning the epistemic licensing
phenomenon of such attitudes, and strive to give a solution to this question.
4.1 Two meaning components
The syntactic and semantic properties of counterfactual attitudes in TSM presented in
Section 3 give us a clear picture of their lexical semantics, which I argue is composed
of two components. Such attitudes seem to convey two inferences: (a) that the attitude
holder takes p, the prejacent proposition, to be true prior to the utterance, and (b) that
the speaker takes ¬p as established in the common ground prior to the utterance. The
first inference captures the first half of the semantics of these attitudes—a representa-
tional component, viz. a universal doxastic assertion. It says that a counterfactual
attitude like liah8-tsun2 would quantify over a set of doxastic worlds, and that liah8-
tsun2 (p) expresses that all worlds compatible with the attitude holder x’s beliefs are
the worlds such that p is true at a contextually salient past time (i.e., the attitude holder
had such belief in p before the utterance time, at which the speaker made the report).
The other half of the semantics of these attitudes is taken care of by the interaction
of the two inferences. The first inference states that the set of worlds that forms the
quantificational domain, i.e., D(w), which the attitude works on, is a set of p-worlds,
and the second inference tells us that the set of common ground worlds, i.e., C, which
contains all the background assumptions (by the speaker), is a set of ¬p-worlds. Since
D(w) is totally excluded from C, which is taken as the world of evaluation (by the
speaker), viz. the actual world, this gives rise to counterfactuality. The interaction of
these two inferences leads to my proposal of a counterfactual felicity condition, which
is the other meaning component involved in the semantics of the attitudes in question.
This proposal is inspired by von Fintel’s (a) discussion on the presupposition of sub-
junctive conditionals. One may question the validity of incorporating a felicity
condition, which is pragmatic in nature, into semantics. It should be noted, however,
that it is not unusual to integrate the pragmatic aspects of presupposition into
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semantics. That is what various proposals within the framework of dynamic semantics
attempted to do; see Heim (1982, 1992) for instance. My proposal in this paper is
another attempt to deal with presupposition (more specifically, counterfactual presup-
position) in semantics.
Note also that the two inferences have different targets. The first inference is aimed
at the attitude holder, and the second at the speaker. The attitude holder may or may
not be the speaker, as I have demonstrated in the previous section. Here are some more








She thought that I was a man.
In 55, the attitude holder is the speaker. The speaker has already taken ¬p as
established in the common ground, and she further talks about her belief in p at a
certain contextually salient past time. Accordingly, counterfactuality results. In 56,
on the other hand, the attitude holder is not the speaker. The speaker takes ¬p as
established in the common ground, and she talks about the attitude holder’s wrong
belief in p at a certain contextually salient time prior to her utterance. Therefore,
the counterfactual interpretation is brought forth when the viewpoint is anchored
to the speaker.
To sum up, the two meaning components in the semantics of counterfactual attitudes
in TSM can be formulated in 57. The Yalcinian notation is used for the formulation
here. In 57, S is an information state parameter of evaluation, w is a world parameter
of evaluation, and t represents a time prior to the time of evaluation, t@ (viz. the utter-
ance time). Counterfactual attitude verbs update S with the set of worlds they quantify
over, S’, which is the attitude holder x’s doxastic worlds, DOXx,w,t. The first half of the
truth-conditions states that the proposition φ is true in the whole quantificational
domain that the counterfactual attitude verb works upon, and the second half states
that such a domain, viz. the set of φ-worlds, is not included in the set of common
ground worlds, where the proposition φ is false.
(57) For any counterfactual attitude (attCF):
a. Doxastic assertion: [[attCF φ]]
c,w,S,g,t = λx. ∀w’∈S’: [[[φ]]c,w’,S’,g,t = 1], where S’
= DOXx,w,t
(In all worlds w’ compatible with the attitude holder x’s beliefs in w at t, φ is
true in w’.)
b. Felicity condition: D(w) ⊈ Ct
(The set of φ-worlds is not a subset of C, which contains all ¬φ-worlds pre-
established in C by the speaker at t, and t < t@.)
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I propose that the first meaning component in 57a is responsible for the licensing of
epistemic modals in the complement clauses of counterfactual attitudes, and the felicity
condition in 57b is responsible for the disallowance of epistemic possibility modals.
This counterfactual felicity condition is also the cause for the lack of parenthetical uses
and the unnegatability of counterfactual attitudes.
4.2 Explaining the distribution of epistemic modals
Recall that counterfactual attitudes in TSM allow epistemic necessity but not possibility










I thought that he might come yesterday, but he didn’t come in the end.
Here, I am going to present how my proposal accounts for this phenomenon. I adopt
the proposal advocated by Veltman (1996), Hacquard (2006, 2010), and Yalcin (2007)
that embedded epistemic modals obtain their modal bases via anaphoric reference.
My analysis goes as follows. The doxastic component in the semantics of coun-
terfactual attitudes provides an information state that epistemic modals can be ana-
phoric to, thereby licensing epistemic modals; however, their counterfactual
component filters out epistemic possibility modals since the resulting existential
quantification over the information state via semantic composition of the modals
and the embedding attitude implies that the domain of quantification is not totally
excluded from the set of common ground worlds. This leads to violation of the fe-
licity condition. Therefore, epistemic possibility modals cannot be licensed in this
attitudinal context.
This analysis is formally represented below. The lexical entries for liah8-tsun2, and
the two epistemic modals,一定 it4-ting7 ‘must’ and 可能 kho2-ling5 ‘might,’ are given in
60 and 61. Example 61 shows the truth-conditions of epistemically modalized
sentences, in which epistemic modals, when unembedded, make claims with respect to
S, the modal base that is assumed to be contextually provided, and the ordering source
parameter g (Kratzer 1981, 1991). For epistemic necessity, the modal statement is true
if and only if the modified proposition is true in all worlds w’ compatible with S in w,
and for epistemic possibility, the modal statement is true if and only if the proposition
is true in some worlds w’ compatible with S in w.
(60) [[liah8-tsun2 (p)]]c,w,S,g,t =
a. λx. ∀w’∈ S’: [[[p]]c,w’,S’,g,t = 1], where S’ = DOXx,w,t
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b. D(w) ⊈ Ct = ∀w’∈ DOXx,w,t [[p]]c,w’,S’,g,t ⊈ Ct, where [[¬p]]c,w,g = 1 iff ∀w”∈ Ct:
[[[¬p]]c,w”,g =1] & t < t@
(61) a. [[it4-ting7 (p)]]c,w,S,g = 1 iff ∀w’∈ S: [[[p]]c,w’,S,g = 1]
b. [[kho2-ling5 (p)]]c,w,S,g = 1 iff ∃w’∈ S: [[[p]]c,w’,S,g = 1]
The truth-conditions for epistemic modals embedded under counterfactual attitudes
are given in 62 and 63. Epistemic modals, when occurring in embedded contexts,
obtain their modal bases from the embedding attitude verbs. In both cases, the coun-
terfactual attitude verb liah8-tsun2 provides the first layer of (universal) quantification
over the doxastic state, and the epistemic modals provide the second layer of quantifi-
cation over the same doxastic state, which is universal for epistemic necessity in 62,
and existential for epistemic possibility in 63, respectively. As shown in the first halves
of 62 and 63, the universal quantifier introduced by the attitude verb liah8-tsun2 is
vacuous, so it can just be removed. We therefore get the results as in 62a and 63a.
While the result in 62a meets the felicity condition, the result in 63a does not. An
inference could be yielded from 63a, which says that there would also be a world
compatible with x’s beliefs at a contextually salient past time in which ¬p was true; this
thus leads to violation of the felicity condition in 63b. As a result, epistemic possibility
modals are not acceptable in the counterfactual attitudinal context.
(62) Epistemic necessity embedded under liah8-tsun2:
a. Doxastic assertion: [[liah8-tsun2 (it4-ting7 p)]]c,w,S,g,t
= λx. ∀w’∈ DOXx,w,t [∀w”∈ DOXx,w,t: [p(w”) = 1]]
= λx. ∀w”∈ DOXx,w,t: [p(w”) =1]
= In all of x’s doxastic worlds at a contextually salient past time, p was true.
b.Felicity condition: w”∈ DOXx,w,t [[p]]
c,w”,S’,g,t ⊈ Ct
where [[¬p]]c,w,g = 1 iff ∀w’”∈ Ct: [¬p(w’”) = 1]
& t < t@
➲ D(w) is totally excluded from Ct; hence, the felicity condition is satisfied.
(63)Epistemic possibility embedded under liah8-tsun2:
a. Doxastic assertion: [[liah8-tsun2 (kho2-ling5 p)]]c,w,S,g,t
= λx. ∀w’∈ DOXx,w,t [∃w”∈ DOXx,w,t: [p(w”) = 1]]
= λx. ∃w”∈ DOXx,w,t: [p(w”) = 1]
= There is a world compatible with x’s beliefs at a contextually salient past time
in which p was true.
b. Felicity condition: w”∈ DOXx,w,t [[p]]
c,w”,S’,g,t ⊈ Ct
where [[¬p]]c,w,g = 1 iff ∀w’”∈ Ct: [¬p(w’”) = 1]
& t < t@
╞ ∃w”∈ DOXx,w,t [[¬p]]c,w”,S’,g,t⊆ Ct
➲ D(w) is not totally excluded from Ct, so the felicity condition is not satisfied.
4.3 The modal 會e7 in TSM
The data given above demonstrate that the epistemic necessity modal, it4-ting7, can be
licensed in the counterfactual attitudinal context, but the epistemic possibility modal,
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kho2-ling5, cannot. Let us further consider the following example, in which the
counterfactual sentence contains the modal e7. The modal e7 in 64 is a future modal
indicating the relative future orientation of the complement clause. This sentence
expresses a presumption made by the attitude holder, the speaker in this case, and the
modal e7 may therefore be taken as an epistemic possibility modal (cf. Lien 2011). One
may take this sentence as a counter-example to the conclusion drawn from the above
observation that epistemic possibility modals cannot be licensed in the embedded




I thought he would come.
Here, I would like to suggest a plausible explanation for this challenge. It has been ar-
gued (see, for example, Lien 2011 and Hsu 2013) that a division of labor is made to
take care of the different functions of the modal e7. The modal e7, when used alone, is
ambiguous between the dynamic and epistemic meaning, and its derivatives, such
as 會曉 e7-hiau2 ‘can (know-how), ’ 會當 e7-tang2 ‘can (potential/permissive), ’ and
會使 e7-sai2 ‘can (potential/permissive), ’ are dynamic and deontic modals. The
example 65 illustrates the dynamic abilitive use of the modal e7, and 66–68 are in-
stances of its derivatives. All these cases can be embedded under counterfactual atti-
tudes, as shown in 69 for example. This is because in these cases, the modal e7 and
its derivatives have their own modal bases (viz. dynamic or circumstantial), no matter
whether they denote inherent ability or circumstantial possibility. They are not evalu-
ated relative to the information state provided by counterfactual attitudes; therefore,








BiQuat has been able to write.
(67)伊會當救咱个性命。(Iunn5, Un2-gian5 楊允言 2003: 156)
i1__e7-tang2__kiu3__lan2__e5__senn3-mia7.
He__can__save__we__MOD__life




This thing is edible/this thing is permitted to eat.




I thought that she could be pregnant…
On the other hand, the modal e7 in the epistemic meaning usually denotes futurity
or genericity. Consider the following examples. The modal e7 in 70–71 expresses the
(relative) futurity of the event, and in 72–73, it indicates regularity of the events de-
scribed by the sentences.
(70)小等咧伊就會來啊, 無要緊啦。(Iunn5, Un2-gian5 楊允言 2003: 858)
sio2-tan2-leh4__i1__to7__e7__lai5__ah4,__bo5__iau3-kin2__lah4.
Wait.a.minute__he__then__will__come __PRT__NEG__matter__PRT
Just wait a minute and he will come shortly, so don’t worry.
(71)我若嫁伊, 會認真做一个好家後。(Iunn5, Un2-gian5楊允言 2003: 690)
gua2__na7__ke3__i1,__e7__jin7-tsin1__tso3__tsit4-e5__ho2__ke1-au7.
I__if__marry__he__will__earnest__act__one-CL__good__wife
If I marry him, I will do my best to be a good wife.






Every time the rapeseed flowers become bright yellow and gorgeous, there would be
bees and butterflies coming to gather nectar.




According to Carlson (1977), a generic sentence is interpreted universally. Therefore,
such sentences are acceptable as embedded complements of counterfactual attitude
verbs, giving rise to no contradiction in quantificational force. As for futurity, whether
the word will is a tense or a modal operator still remains controversial (see, e.g., Copley
2002, Condoravdi 2003 and Klecha 2014 for a modal analysis, and Kissine 2008 and Del
Prete 2014 for a temporal analysis); however, it has been widely accepted that the default
interpretation of a sentence with a future morpheme is a universal quantification over a
domain of possible alternatives (e.g., Copley 2002; Del Prete 2014; Giannakidou and Mari
2015, 2016), regardless of the source of the quantificational force (i.e., contributed by the
future morpheme itself or obtained through the supervaluation of the global linguistic
context in which the future morpheme is embedded; cf. Del Prete 2014). If we take
this view, a sentence expressing future eventuality is compatible with embedding
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counterfactual attitude verbs, too. Therefore, I argue that 64 is not a problem for the epi-
stemic licensing of counterfactual attitudes in TSM (Giannakidou, Anastasia and Alda
Mari 2015).
5 Conclusion
In this work, counterfactual attitudes in TSM were studied. I presented their syntactic
and semantic properties, showing that they do not have the same behavior as typical
representational attitudes with respect to the parenthetical use, negatability, and
epistemic licensing. I also proposed a semantic analysis to account for these properties,
explaining in particular why they allow epistemic necessity but not possibility modals
in their complement clauses. I argued that there are two meaning components in their
lexical semantics, one being the doxastic assertion and the other the counterfactual
felicity condition. It is this latter component that distinguishes them from other
representational attitudes.
Our findings in this paper suggest that counterfactual attitudes, which are not taken
into account by Anand and Hacquard (2013), should be singled out from the represen-
tational category and constitute a fourth type of attitude verb. This study therefore
contributes to the research on attitudes and motivates a finer-grained typology of
attitudes based on the distributional differences of epistemic modals in complement
clauses.
6 Endnotes
aThis corpus (http://140.114.116.3/DB/index.php) is compiled by National Tsing Hua
University, comprising both spoken and written data, collected from eight modern
Taiwanese drama series and 40 folk stories. The eight drama series are 出外人生
Chuwai Rensheng (CWRS), 後山日先照 Houshan Ri Xian Zhao (HSRXZ), 呼叫223
Hujiao 223 (HJ223), 四重奏 Si Chong Zou (SCZ), 鐵樹花開 Tieshu Hua Kai (TSHK),
酒矸通賣無 Tsiu2-kan1 Thang1 Be7 Bo5 (TKTBB), 我在, 因為你的愛 Wo Zai, Yinwei
Ni-de Ai (WZYWNDA), and 月亮出來了 Yueliang Chulai-le (YLCLL).
bThe abbreviations used in this paper include the following: ASP = aspect marker, CL =
classifier, COP = copula, DIM = diminutive suffix, MOD = modification marker, NEG =
negation, PASS = passive marker, PRG = progressive marker, PRT = particle, Q = question
marker, RETORT = retort marker, and SUBJ = subjunctive mood.
cI am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this example to my attention.
dI thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to this issue.
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